Purpose of review Mycobacterium chimaera infections following cardiac surgery have been reported from an increasing number of countries. These infections are characterized by a poor prognosis with a case fatality rate around 50% despite treatment. Since the first description in 2013, our understanding has grown steadily. Several outbreak investigations, case series, and experiments with heater-cooler units (HCUs) have been published. This review summarizes the current knowledge.
INTRODUCTION
Following an initial report on the outbreak investigation of Mycobacterium chimaera infections after open heart surgery, a steadily increasing number of cases has been reported from several countries [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . This review addresses the current knowledge of this global M. chimaera outbreak (Table 1) .
M. chimaera, one of the latest members of the Mycobacterium avium complex, was first described in 2004 [6] . Clinical reports identified M. chimaera as a relatively rare cause of mycobacterial lung disease [7] . Pulmonary infections caused by M. chimaera are considered equally or less virulent than Mycobacterium intracellulare [7, 8] . More recently, M. chimaera contamination has been identified in a number of water-containing medical devices such as heater-cooler units (HCUs) of various brands [9 && ,10,11 & ,12 && ], extracorporeal membrane oxygenators [13] , hyper-hypothermia systems feeding cooling-warming blankets (personal communication P.W.S. and H.S.), and water fountains [9 && ].
Owing to the association with M. chimaera infections, HCUs have come into the focus of infection prevention and control teams, public health and regulatory authorities, and the public. HCUs are a functional part, yet standalone device, of the extracorporeal circuit in surgery requiring cardiopulmonary bypass and responsible for temperature regulation of blood and cardioplegia solution.
Water is used as heat transfer medium because of its ideal properties for this purpose. Superfluous heat is typically dissipated by a radiator and a fan.
TRANSMISSION OF MYCOBACTERIUM CHIMAERA DURING CARDIAC SURGERY
Historically, blood-borne infections originating from the heart-lung machine were reported [14] , but in modern devices such leaks are very rare [15] . ]. Matching random amplified polymorphic DNA PCR patterns between water and corresponding air samples confirmed M. chimaera aerosolization further [9 && ]. The hydrophobic nature of cell membrane of mycobacteria results in exceedingly high concentration of M. chimaera at water surfaces and consequently, in bioaerosols [22] . A feature of LivaNova 3T HCUs is the presence of several fans, a large one for heat dissipation in the lower part and smaller fans in the upper part of the device to cool electronic components. One study located aerosolization leakage and dissipation by an upper fan [10] . Aerosol release has been traced to leakage at the edge of the tank's roof [12 && ]. Experiments using particle counters and smoke showed that airflow and emitted bioaerosols of LivaNova HCUs can disrupt the ultraclean air system designed to protect the operating field [21 && ]. Similar experiments with other HCU brands are missing. Two experiments produced negative results for the alternative hypothesis of direct transmission via water-to-blood leakage through a defective oxygenator membrane. Intraoperative blood cultures of 32 patients with surgery using contaminated HCUs did not produce M. chimaera [9 && ]. A surrogate blood circuit on prolonged extracorporeal circulation with a M. chimaera contaminated HCU remained without mycobacterial growth [10] .
ORIGIN OF HEATER-COOLER UNIT CONTAMINATION
Nontuberculous mycobacteria are known to colonize hospital water systems [23] and contaminate medical devices. Hence, HCU contamination at the hospital level cannot be excluded and other nontuberculous mycobacteria besides M. chimaera might pose a similar risk. Recently, contamination from tap water with Mycobacterium abscessus resulting in HCUassociated infections was reported [24 && ]. Increasing evidence points toward a clonal strain of M. chimaera related to one manufacturer's device being responsible for the majority of cases in the current international outbreak. Already in the first case report about two surgery-related M. chimaera infections; a match between patient isolates by random amplified polymorphic DNA PCR was reported [25] . Current studies employed whole genome sequencing to compare M. chimaera patient strains and found them to be almost identical. A recent study described clonality among isolates from HCUs and patients in Denmark and the USA [26 & ]. In a cluster of 11 patients and samples derived from five LivaNova 3T HCUs, a genetic distance of maximal 38 single nucleotide polymorphisms across a core genome of circa five million base pairs was seen [27] . Similarly, clonal M. chimaera isolates were described in HCU water samples and one cardiac surgery patient from Australia and New Zealand, also matching the 11 US patient strains [5] .
Until now, all cardiac surgery-associated cases were associated with LivaNova 3T HCUs. One has to consider, however, that devices of other manufacturers are much less prevalent [28] . Water samples from the water pump assembly area at the LivaNova production site as well as from factory-new HCUs confirmed the presence of M. chimaera pointing to a contamination at the time of production [16 & ]. In August 2014, M. chimaera positive environmental samples at the manufacturing site prompted
KEY POINTS
Contamination of LivaNova 3T HCUs with M. chimaera likely occurred during production, but contamination of any HCU at the local level remains relevant.
Airborne transmission of aerosolized M. chimaera from HCU water to affected individuals during cardiac surgery.
M. chimaera infections are characterized by latency up to 5.1 years, poor prognosis: curability remains uncertain.
HCU-associated M. chimaera infections are likely underdiagnosed.
Sustainable decontamination of contaminated HCUs
has not yet been established, necessitating strict separation of HCU from operating room air. analysis, strain isolated from Maquet HCU was distinct from those from Sorin HCU; Sorin strain nearly identical to isolates from US and UK; description of preventive measures (encasing in one, HCU repositioning in the operating room and more frequent decontamination in two, and placement outside operating room (preexisting) in two centers).
PREVENTING TRANSMISSION
To guarantee protection against contaminated bioaerosols, HCU have been outplaced in an adjacent room [10, 30] . Notably, an ajar door may allow bioaerosols to float back into the operating room [10] .
The maximum allowed HCU tubing length is a limiting factor to this solution. Purpose-built airtight encasings for LivaNova 3T HCUs directly connected to the ventilation system of the operating room have been successfully produced [31 && ]. This solution required an individual technical assessment of the overall air flow management to be well tolerated, but if feasible, cost might be inferior to those for architectural solutions.
HEATER-COOLER UNIT DECONTAMINATION AND MAINTENANCE
Studies testing HCU decontamination and maintenance procedures either used solid media [10] , mycobacterial growth indicator tubes [29] , or both [9 && ,31 && ], and various water volumes, reflecting the lack of a standard and limiting comparison.
In a recent report, water samples from a cohort of five factory-new LivaNova 3T HCUs in use for 6 months tested positive for mycobacteria, mostly M. chimaera under an intensified maintenance protocol including daily water changes [31 && ]. All air samples remained negative for M. chimaera, probably because of a low bacterial burden. Garvey et al. [11 & ] published a report on successful decontamination of M. chimaera contaminated LivaNova 3T HCUs. The authors used a comprehensive approach with mechanical removal of biofilm, replacement of HCU parts, and two consecutive peracetic acid disinfection cycles. Mycobacterial suppression for a period of 3 months after initial decontamination was achieved under intensified maintenance with daily water changes using filtered tap water and added hydrogen peroxide, and weekly peracetic acid disinfection cycles. Sustainability must yet be established.
DISCUSSION
The outbreak is yet another example of contamination of a complex medical device and other unintended consequences that has required an international investigation and effort. Although the extent of this outbreak is yet unknown, the current global case count is relatively low when compared to other causes of surgical site infections. This rarity can be explained by a stochastic phenomenon or alternatively, by the alignment of several safety breakdowns that are best illustrated by the Swiss Cheese Model (Fig. 1) . It must be assumed, however, that many patients remain undiagnosed or misdiagnosed because of insufficient physician knowledge about this disease and likely, a lack of understanding potential risks associated with such complex equipment. Reactivation after years of latency might occur as known with M. tuberculosis. Case detection remains challenging because of missing diagnostic tests in latency. Most guidelines recommend targeting patients with prior HCU exposure and unclear inflammatory disease, especially with granulomatous manifestations.
Various HCU brands have proven to harbor M. chimaera, nontuberculous mycobacteria and other potential pathogens. Even if cases so far have only been associated with LivaNova 3T, safety of other models and brands has yet to be formally established. Consequently, before proof of well tolerated HCU technology becomes available, the air volume in contact with HCU must be controlled either by encasing the unit or placing it in a separate room with controlled ventilation, especially if proven contaminated with M. chimaera. Relying entirely on negative mycobacterial HCU water and air cultures might be risky until culture test sensitivity is established.
The outbreak brings several lessons to the medical community. First, the delayed outbreak investigation and mitigation highlights a striking mismatch between a global industry distributing sophisticated technology widely from one factory and the fractioned public health authority systems reacting with delay. Second, only an elegant and painstakingly thorough outbreak investigation by several international groups revealed and identified the aspects of this equipment that led to patient harm. Third, airflow producing devices can disrupt the genuine ventilation design and create microbiologic risks. Fourth, being an apparently irreplaceable heat transport medium, water cannot be maintained sterile in HCU and once established, removing biofilm-associated nontuberculous mycobacteria seems uncertain. Fifth, nontuberculous mycobacteria are to be added to the list of pathogens in healthcare water and air safety to pair Legionella spp. and Aspergillus sps. And finally, complex medical equipment should be thoroughly tested by a third party prior to market introduction, especially in its context of use often constituting a complex system that notoriously produces unexpected risk constellations, and permanently and proactively monitored for unintended consequences.
CONCLUSION
By pure chance and a consequent investigation, an inane patient safety breach was uncovered in the sophisticated and high-stake environment of cardiac surgery. This breach is best described by the Swiss cheese model of aligning failure modes leading to catastrophe (Fig. 1) . The extent of the harm done has yet to be seen. Immediate action is warranted both, to identify infected individuals and have them benefit from early treatment, and to prevent further infections by swift action. It would be desirable that forces could be joined across research teams, authorities, and industries globally to rapidly produce a well tolerated alternative for intraoperative temperature management in cardiac surgery.
